Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage: Conflict of Interest and Interests in Conflict by Kroll, Robert E.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 2 Article 2
January 1982
Dual Agency in Residential Real Estate Brokerage:
Conflict of Interest and Interests in Conflict
Robert E. Kroll
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation




DUAL AGENCY IN RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE: 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND 
INTERESTS IN CONFLICT 
The most critical issue in today's real estate 
transactions is the inherent conflict of interest 
created by dual representation by the real estate 
broker in the usual real estate transaction. The 
problem is endemic in the common transaction 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The nature of the agency relationships between residential 
real estate brokers and their clients has always been somewhat 
paradoxical, very problematic, and fraught with potential fraud, 
malfeasance, and serious conflicts of interest.1 Unsophisticated 
vendors and purchasers of residential property rely heavily on 
the expertise of real estate brokers in matters of price, terms, 
financing, and the condition and habitability of the real property 
in question despite the fact that conflicting loyalties and objec-
tives commonly exist between the real estate broker and the bro-
ker's clients. 
The broker's role is no longer merely that of a salesperson 
1. 1 H. MILLO & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE § 4:18, at 17 
(Supp. 1981). 
2. Litchfield, Unprofessional Conduct by Real Estate Brokers: Conflict of Interest 
and Conflict in the Law, 11 PACIFIC L.J. 821 (1980). Litchfield quotes Justice Cardozo in 
Roman v. Lobe, 243 N.Y. 51, 54, 152 N.E. 461, 462, (1926): "The real estate broker is 
brought by his calling into a relation of trust and confidence. Constant are the opportu· 
nities by concealment and collusion to extract illicit gains. We know from our judicial 
records that the opportunities have not been lost." See also Comment, A Reexamination 
of the Real Estate Broker·Buyer·Seller Relationship, 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1343 (1972). 
379 
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or middleman whose legal obligations require only honesty and 
fairness. a The real estate broker is held to a professional stan-
dard of care as to knowledge of the real property being sold.' 
The common law considers the broker an agent with fiduciary 
duties of absolute loyalty to clients, including the duty to dis-
close to the principals any information which could result in a 
decision not to buy or not to sell.' The broker may also be re-
quired to disclose information adverse to his own interests (i.e., 
the interest in consummating a sale).· Yet. it appears from a re-
view of the cases that the full scope of the broker's role is unset-
tled. and. unsettling.? The law on the subject is in flux. Both the 
California Department of Real Estate and the Federal Trade 
Commission are engaged in detailed inquiries into these rela-
tionships to determine what legislative or administrative reme-
dies may exist for the maladies of the real property business.' 
The perils of broker representation to home sellers and 
home buyers. the unsophisticated segment of the real estate 
3. Under certain circumstances, the real estate broker may be held to be only a 
"middleman." See note 26 and accompanying text infra for the middleman exception. 
4. Brady v. Carman, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960). 
5. Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 223, 169 P.2d 371,376 (1946). See text accom-
panying notes 72-75 infra. 
6. Stamber and Stein, The Real Estate Broker-Schizophrenia or Conflict of Inter-
ests, 28 J.B.A.D.C. 16 (1961), quoted in Comment, supra note 2, at 1344. In the typical 
real estate transaction the broker receives a contingent fee; that ii, a commiaaion bued 
on a fixed percentage of the gross sale price. If the sale falla through, the realtor gets 
nothing. The longer the deal takes to close, the longer the realtor must wait for the 
commission. Thus, if the realtor discloses to the seller that the buyer's financial position 
is weak and that the buyer will likely deCault on a proposed second mortgage to be held 
by the seller, the seller is likely to reject the offer. 
7. When the broker, as negotiator between the contracting par-
ties, works for a contingent Cee payable only if the realty is 
actually sold, he favors any sale to earn his fee with a mini-
mum time investment rather than risking loss of the aale and 
commission by fully prosecuting the seller's interest to obtain 
the highest and best price. 
Comment, supra note 2, at 1344. It is "understandably" difficult for a broker not to urge 
acceptance of a buyer's offer, regardless of fairnesa to the seller. Id. at 0.5_ 
8. The California Department of Real Estate has commisaioned two studies on 
agency and dual agency relationships. See notes 17 and 20 infra. The Federal Trade 
Commission has undertaken a staff investigation after receiving numerous complaints 
from real estate agents, consumers and consumer rroups about unfair practices in the 
industry and inadequate representation of parties' interests. Among the issues that have 
been covered in the inquiry are the role of the broker in residential brokerage transac-
tions, including conflicting duties and interests which make it difficult to adequately re-
present consumers. 45 Fed. Reg. 77,959 (1980). 
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market, are particularly acute because of the prevalence of bro-
kers practicing dual agency. Dual agency exists when the adverse 
parties to a transaction are represented either by one broker act-
ing in a dual capacity,9 or by a listing broker and a cooperating 
(or buyer's) broker who, at common law, is also the seller's 
agent,10 or by two agents or salespeople of a single brokerage 
firm (which is the same as dual capacity).l1 Such relationships 
are permitted by law (and widely used) in California, despite the 
obvious conflicts of interest, provided both principals consent to 
the arrangement after disclosure by the agent.11 
Real estate transactions are becoming increasingly complex 
in a market in which "creative financing" rather than conven-
tional bank financing is the norm,18 and where real estate agents 
are as much financial advisers and mortgage brokers as they are 
salespeople. These financial complexities increase the danger 
that misbegotten loyalties will leave either the buyer, the seller 
or both hanging by a slender financial thread. l • Full disclosure 
by agents of possible future financial dangers is viewed as 
counter-productive by the agent. As a result, undisclosed or in-
sufficiently disclosed dual agency has become a common prob-
9. 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Agency and Employment § 97 (8th 
ed.198O). 
10. The listing broker, also called the seller's broker, has a contractual relationship 
with the vendor. The cooperating broker brings a prospective buyer to the seller in ex-
pectation of sharing the commission if a sale is consummated. 
11. The listing broker is the seller's agent. Rodes v. Shannon, 222 Cal. App. 2d 721, 
725, 35 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (1963). The cooperating broker brings the buyer to the deal 
and in most cases splits the commission with the listing broker. Under most multiple 
listing agreements, the cooperating broker is deemed a sub-agent of the listing broker, 
hence an agent to the seller. CAL. CIY. CODE §§ 2349, 2351 (West 1954). 
12. Wilson v. Lewis, 106 Cal. App. 3d 802, 806, 165 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398 (1980); 
Bonaccorso v. Kaplan, 218 Cal. App. 2d 63, 68, 32 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1963); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958). 
13. The Wall Street Journal quotes the National Association of Realtors as predict-
ing that up to 70 percent of home resales will depend on some form of creative financing, 
that is, where the seller carries or assists in some part of the financing. Chase, Creative 
Loans: How to Sell a House? Lend Buyer the Funds, Homeowners Discover, Wall St. J., 
May 1, 1980, at 1, col. 6. A recent survey of creative financing in California shows 56 
percent of home transactions sampled involve some form of seller-assisted, non-conven-
tional or creative financing. CALIFORNIA TECHNICAL AsSISTANCE AssOCIATES, INC., THE Ex-
TENT AND NATURE OF CREATIVE FINANCING IN RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS IN 
CALIFORNIA 2 (1981) (commissioned by the California Department of Real Estate). 
14. See Samson & Kirby, Creative Financing Abuses. Creative Litigation Against 
the Mortgage Loan Broker, REAL PROPERTY NEWS, Fall, 1981, at 10. 
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lem,l& although that is a ground for rescission by either party as 
a matter of agency law, even if no harm is doneY' 
Dual agency has become the customary arrangement in resi-
dential real estate transactionsl'7 largely because of the wide-
spread use of multiple-listing agreements. Most multiple listing 
agreements create sub-agency relations between the cooperating 
broker and the seller's broker,!' giving rise to fiduciary duties 
between the seller and the cooperating broker, who ostensibly 
represents the buyer. Those duties effectively preclude adequate 
representation of the buyer. 
Broker confusion over and ignorance of the duties and lia-
bilities of a real estate agent is widespread. II The inherent dan-
ger of litigation from such confusion, and the desire to bring an 
air of professionalism to real estate brokerage have resulted in 
establishment of a growing number of "alternative" or buyers' 
brokers, who use single or general agency (~conflicted) 
arrangements.IIO 
Some real estate industry observers say there is a growing 
concern that dual agency is not only unethical per se but may be 
15. 1 MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, § 4:18, at 17·20. 
16. Id. at 19. 
17. CALIFORNIA TECHNICAL AsSISTANCB AssocIATES, INC., DUAL AGENCY PROBLBMS IN 
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 40·41 (1981) (commissioned by the California 
Department of Real Estate) [Hereinafter cited as CTAA DUAL AGBNCY report]. 
18. Id. at 13. 
19. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging 
Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REv. 767, 772 (1978). The author, a licensed real estate 
broker, contends cooperating brokers either ignore or are unaware of their duties to sell· 
ers, and many merely assume the sub·agency clauses in listing contracts are intended 
only to confer the right to earn a commission from the seller. Id. 
20. Small firms of alternative brokers, offering to work on a flat fee, or hourly fee 
rather than commission basis, have been established around the .tate. CALD'ORNIA TECH· 
NICAL ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATES, INC., THE EXTENT AND NATURa or SINGLE AGENCY REAL 
ESTATE PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA 3·5 (1981) [hereinafter cited 81 r:fAA SINGLE AGENCY 
report). See also Gina Williams Outrages Brokers By Cutting Fees, Selling Secrets, 
Wall St. J., Aug. 13, 1980, at 29, coL 1. 
The Menlo Park· Atherton Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service has adopted a 
listing agreement that expressly negates the Bub·agency relationship common in other 
California multiple listing contracts. The Menlo Park agreement explicitly makes the 
cooperating broker the buyer's broker. Menlo Park's is the only MLS agreement in Cali· 
fornia with explicit single agency understandings. r:fAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra at 
31. 
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legally untenable.21 Under the current scheme of relationships in 
the ordinary real estate transaction, there is also a growing con-
sensus that buyers of real estate are often unrepresented, largely 
due to the dual agency.1I 
This Comment will explore the legal status and vulnerabil-
ity of real estate brokers who engage in dual agency. It will dis-
cuss the under-representation of home buyers, and the advan-
tages and disadvantages of some suggested statutory and 
administrative reforms requiring or encouraging single, uncon-
flicted agency arrangements in residential real estate transac-
tions.la It concludes that: 
[1] unlike commercial and industrial real estate buyers 
who usually are represented separately, in dual 
agency transactions the relatively naive home buyer 
is effectively unrepresented; 
[2] dual representation is frequently not adequately or 
meaningfully disclosed to either the buyer or the 
seller; 
[3] even when disclosed and mutually consented to, the 
inherently-conflicted dual agency relationship leads 
to unfair dealing which can be undone only through 
the expensive and wasteful process of rescission; 
[4] undisclosed or inadequately disclosed dual agency 
may become a leading ground upon which disgrun-
tled buyers and sellers will seek to rescind common 
residential real estate transactions; and, 
[5] dual agency fails to serve the consumer in what is 
normally the largest single personal transaction: a 
home purchase or sale. 
The only way to avoid these problems is the elimination or dis-
couragement of dual agency in residential real estate 
transactions. 
21. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, at § 4:18. 
22. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 51. 
23. [d. See also note 9 supra. 
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II. DISCUSSION 
A. REAL ESTATE AGENCY: SELLER-BROKER RELATIONSHIP 
An agency is created when the principal and agent mutually 
agree that the agent will act on the principal's behalf and be 
subject to the principal's control.u Under the California com-
mon law of agency, real estate brokers, and their licensed sales-
people, are agents and have a fiduciary relationship to their cli-
ents with a duty of absolute loyalty, confidentiality and the 
utmost good faith. III The major exception to that rule is in the 
truly exceptional situation when the broker is acting strictly as a 
"middleman", that is, when the scope of the broker's employ-
ment is limited to bringing parties together, and where the bro-
ker has no authority to negotiate, i.e., exercise discretion.le 
The courts have long held the real estate agent owes the 
principal the same duty of undivided service, confidentiality and 
loyalty that a trustee owes his beneficiary. I? It is basic to the 
agency relationship that the broker is not permitted to obtain 
any interest that is adverse to his principal or to secure any 
financial advantage over his principal either through the use of 
fraud, deceit, concealment or misrepresentation." Any secret 
profits from the sale of a principal's property reaped by the 
agent may be recovered by the principal. II The classic instance 
of a broker's taking advantage of his principal is when the 
24. However, authority to exercise discretion is not essential to creation of agency. 
Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432, 439, 546 P.2d 307, 311, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (1976); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 3, comments a, c (1958). 
25. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 109·10, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 
597·98 (1968). In this Comment, the terms broker and agent are used interchangeably. 
The broker is a real estate agent who has met the state real estate broker's license reo 
quirements in addition to the real estate agent's licensure regulations. A real estate sales 
agent must operate under the auspices of a broker, however. See CAL. Bus. & Paor. CODE 
§§ 10000·10185 (West 1964). 
26. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 668·69, 441 P.2d 101, 106,68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 
591 (1968). 
27. Rattray v. Scudder, 18 Cal. 2d 214, 222·23, 169 P.2d 371, 376 (1946) (real estate 
broker's license revocation upheld for breach of fiduciary duty). 
28. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 109·10, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 
598 (1968). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 389, Comment a (1958): "[A)n 
agent who is appointed to sell or to give advice concerning sales violates his duty if, 
without the principal's knowledge, he sells to himself or purchases from the principal 
through the medium of a 'straw' .... " 
29. Bate v. Marsteller, 232 Cal. App. 2d 605, 616, 43 Cal. Rptr. 149, 157 (1965). See 
also 1 B. WrTKIN, supra note 9, at § 90. 
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seller's agent, on learning of a buyer who is willing to pay more 
than the asking price for a property, buys the property from the , 
principal and resells it to the buyer at an immediate profitaO-a 
clear fiduciary breach. 
In California, the seller has a duty to disclose facts, materi-
ally affecting the desirability or value of the property, known to 
her or accessible only to her.al Under general agency law, the 
listing (seller's) agent is under the same duty." The agent's duty 
to the buyer must, of necessity, be exercised at the expense of 
the broker's duty of loyalty to the seller when the agent pos-
sesses negative information about the property.aa Further, the 
principal and agent are liable for each other's negligence." Any 
broker who transmits an offer of a prospective buyer is typically 
deemed a sub-agent of the listing broker with fiduciary obliga-
tions to the seller, whether or not the broker had any previous 
dealings or agreement with the seller.1II Under California statu-
tory law, the listing agent or broker is not liable to third persons 
for the acts of the sub-agent. at But to avoid injustices, the courts 
have been willing to find an agency relationship whenever 
needed to protect the interests of either party damaged by a real 
30. Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959). 
31. Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204-05 
(1963). See also Jorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 3d 155, 177 Cal. 
Rptr. 882 (1981) (duty to disclose that buyers are investors and that listing broker has 
substantial personal stake in strikiug a good bargain for them). 
32. Lingscb v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963). In 
Lingsch, the buyers sued the seller for fraud for failure to disclose conditions of disrepair 
of an apartment building. The court held the seller liable. The broker, 88 agent, may be 
held jointly and severally liable for a failure to disclose material facts to the buyer. 
33. Comment, ,upra note 2, at 1352. 
34. CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 2338-2339 (West 1954). 
35. CAL. ClY. CODE §§ 2349, 2351 (West 1954). "A subagent is a person appointed by 
an agent empowered to do 80, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for the 
principal, but for whose conduct the agent agrees with the principal to be primarily reo 
sponsible." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 5 (1958). The sub· agent is an agent of 
both the listing broker and the principal. rd. See Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App.2d 
390,394-95,333 P.2d 423, 425-26 (1958) (listing broker held liable to sellers for misrepre· 
sentation by cooperating brokers to buyers); Johnston v. Seargeants, 152 Cal. App. 2d 
180,313 P.2d 41 (1957) (cooperatiDg broker held liable to sellers for cancellation by buy· 
ers because of cooperating broker's misrepresentation to buyers). 
Buyers are usually unaware of the sub· agency clause in listing agreements, and do 
not realize the cooperating broker, who is ostensibly representiDg them, in fact has confi· 
dential and fiduciary duties to the seller. Romero, supra note 19, at 772. That clause . 
"seems to be ignored by, if not unknown to, many selling (cooperating) agents." rd. 
36. CAL. ClY. CODE § 2351 (West 1954). Contra REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 
5, Comment d (1958). . 
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estate broker's actions.37 
Agency Agreements 
An agency relationship between a broker and a seller may 
be written or oral, but most are created by one of the three com-
mon broker employment contracts or listing agreements: (1) the 
open listing, authorizing the broker to act as agent for the seller 
with commission going to any broker who closes the sale on 
terms agreeable to the seller; (2) the exclusive agency or exclu-
sive right to sell agreement, guaranteeing the commission goes to 
the broker holding the exclusive position, regardless of who sells 
the property; or (3) the multiple listing.3s The multiple listing 
agreement, where available, is probably the most common resi-
dential real estate agency agreement because it gives a property 
the broadest exposure to the market.38 In a multiple listing, the 
property is listed with a local board of realtors' multiple listing 
service (MLS), a directory of houses for sale. The public has ac-
cess to the MLS listing through member brokers. In the typical 
MLS arrangement, the listing broker splits his commission with 
any "cooperating" broker who brings in a successful offer and 
closes the sale.·o 
Each of those agreements provides the opportunity for dual 
agency relationshipsu as will be explained in the next section. 
37. See Miller v. Wood, 222 Cal. App. 2d 206, 209, 35 Cal. Rptr. 49, 51 (1963) hold-
ing, "Where one of two innocent parties must suffer because of the fraud of a third, the 
loss must be borne by the person whose negligence and misplaced confidence made in-
jury possible." Accord, Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432, 440, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 24 
(1976); Whiteman v. Leonard Realty, 189 Cal. App. 2d 373, 376, 11 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 
(1961) (implied agency may arise from the words and conduct of the parties and the 
circumstances of the particular case). 
38. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 11, 13. 
39. Id. at 13. 
40. Id. at 14-15. 
41. lIlt is apparent that from the judicial perspective, the broker 
who negotiates a sale of his own listing to a buyer who haa 
engaged that same broker, and the cooperating broker in the 
cooperative transaction, will be considered aa the agent of the 
seUer, or the buyer, or both, which for all practical purposes 
makes him a dual agent in such tranaactions. 
1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 1, at § 4:18, at 18. Where one broker represents 
both parties to a transaction, both buyers rightfuUy consider the broker their broker, 
and the broker "erroneously" believes it is possible to be in the middle and serve two 
masters. In the cooperative transaction, each party incorrectly believes that he is repre-
sented by his broker alone and that his broker is not also the broker to the other party. 
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Buyer-Broker Relationship 
Express agency relations between a real estate broker and a 
prospective buyer of residential real estate are not common. The 
buyer usually deals directly with the seller's agent or with a "co-
operating" broker. The real estate industry refers to a broker, 
other than the seller's agent, who procures a buyer for a piece of 
real property as the cooperating broker.·· The cooperating bro-
ker cooperates with the seller's agent as a sub-agent in order to 
obtain a share (usually half) of the seller's commission. Thus, 
there is an unsavory relationship between cooperating agents 
and their buyers in that the cooperating broker has exactly the 
same financial motivation as the seller's broker to quickly close 
the deal at any relatively high price." 
In practice, there is seldom a written agreement between 
the buyer and the cooperating broker for representation in pro-
curing a home. The cooperating broker is guaranteed a commis-
sion through the seller's listing agreement. The buyer receives 
free representation to the extent of the presentation of the offer. 
The courts, however, have generally found an agreement implied 
from the actions of the parties, based on the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties.·· 
In the ordinary course of business, a buyer looking for a 
home seldom exercises any selectivity in who will represent her. 
Buyers typically contact the seller's broker directly in reference 
to the particular house in which he or she is interested because 
the listing broker has advertised the listing. Often, the seller's 
broker shows Blackacre to the buyer, discusses the possibility of 
an offer, and may even draw up an offer, which is made out in 
the form of a contract or deposit receipt. The offer is presented 
to the seller by the seller's broker, and if accepted, the sale may 
be consummated without the buyer ever having an agent in the 
fullest sense. If the buyer and seller fail to strike a bargain for 
Blackacre, the same broker may show the buyer Whiteacre or 
Brownacre without ever discussing the establishment of agency 
Id. 
42. The expression is a term of art referring to the clause in multiple listing agree-
ments that permits members of the multiple listing service to assist in or cooperate in 
procuring a purchaser of a listed property. 
43. See note 7 supra. 
44. See Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533, 541 (1946). 
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relations. 
B. DUAL AGENCY 
Dual agency is created when two essentially adverse princi-
pals, i.e., vendor and purchaser, are represented by a single en-
tity or corporate agent.4& Dual agency in real estate is created in 
two ways: either when the listing broker (or two sales agents em-
ployed by same broker) represents both sides in the sales trans-
action, or when a listing broker and a cooperating broker are 
involved in a transaction. The listing broker has a fiduciary 
duty, created by the employment contract, to negotiate a sale at 
the highest price and at the terms most favorable to the seller.·' 
The cooperating broker has an implied agency relationship'" to 
the prospective buyer to make reasonable efforts to negotiate 
the purchase at the lowest possible price acceptable to the seller. 
These obviously contradictory duties will be discussed later. 
Where buyer and seller are represented by two sales agents 
of a single broker or brokerage firm, the situation is the same as 
if the broker himself were representing both principals. Under 
California law the broker has a duty to exercise reasonable su-
pervision over his sales staff,4I who are the broker's agents,·' and 
who typically share in the sales commission. 
In the typical multiple listing agreement, the listing broker 
is expressly the agent of the seller with fiduciary obligations to 
the seller.IIO The usual MLS agreement constitutes an offer of 
sub-agency to all other MLS members. III A cooperating broker 
who submits an offer on behalf of a prospective buyer is deemed 
to have accepted the listing broker's offer of sub-agency, and 
thus the cooperating broker has fiduciary obligations to the 
45. The courts have carefully distinguished acts performed by the agent of one prin-
cipal for the opposing principal, such as lending funds for a down payment, from acts 
that involve at least potential conflicts of interest. See McConnell v. Cowan, 44 Cal. 2d 
805, 285 P.2d 261 (1955). 
46. As to the broker's fiduciary role, Bee notes 25-30 BUPI'CI. 
47. See Vargas v. Ruggiero, 197 Cal. App. 2d 709, 715, 17 Cal. Rptr. 568, 570-71 
(1961). 
48. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177(h) (West Supp. 1981). 
49. Ct. Gipson v. Davis Realty Co., 215 Cal. App. 2d 190, 206-07, 30 Cal. Rptr. 253, 
262 (1963) (personal injury). 
50. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 14-15. 
51. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, at § 4:18, at 17-18. 
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seller. III In Kruse v. Miller,'s for example, the buyer sued the 
seller for misrepresentations made by the cooperating broker 
about the condition of the property, and the buyer was awarded 
judgment. The seller then sued the cooperating broker for 
breach of the duty to inform him of the misrepresentation. The 
court held the cooperating broker was a sub-agent of the listing 
broker, and had a duty to act with the utmost good faith toward 
the seller and breached that duty by concealing the 
misrepresentation. a. 
The courts have held the cooperating broker to be a sub-
agent of the listing broker and an agent of the seller with full 
fiduciary obligations to the seller," despite the reasonable ex-
pec~tions of the buyer. It appears agency fiduciary obligations 
may be imposed by a court long after the transaction has been 
consummated in an attempt to protect a wronged party." 
Disclosure 
Dual agency is generally improper as against public policya' 
because of the prospect of fraud. Dual representation is permit-
ted only when it is done with the full knowledge and consent of 
both principals. Ie California has codified that exception and pro-
52. ld. at 18. 
53. 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (1956). 
54. ld. at 660, 300 P.2d at 857. See also Johnston v. Seargeants, 152 Cal. App. 2d 
180, 313 P.2d 41 (1957) (cooperating broker held to be agent of sellen even though she 
had never met the sellen). 
55. Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432, 439, n.8, 546 P.2d 307, 312,128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 
24 (1976), Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 660, 300 P.2d 855, 857 (1956). See 3 
CAL. JUR. 3D Agency § 60. Miller and Starr contend that when the cooperating broker 
becomes an agent of the seller, the listing agent, under CAL. Crv. CODE § 2351, should no 
longer be liable for the wrongs committed by the cooperating broker. However, Miller 
and Starr note Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958) and 
Johnson v. Seargeants, 152 Cal. App. 2d 180, 313 P.2d 41 (1957), have held the listing 
broker liable for wrongful acts of the cooperating broker. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, 
supra note I, at § 4:18, at 18. Ironically, the courts have also held the principal liable for 
the wrongful acts of the subagent. Eye v. Kafer, 202 Cal. App. 2d 449, 454, 20 Cal. Rptr. 
841, 844 (1962); Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 660, 300 P.2d 855, 857 (1956); 
Whiteman v. Leonard Realty Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 373, 376, 11 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213 
·(1961). 
56. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, at § 4:18. See note 32 supra. 
57. 1 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OP CALJIIORNIA LAw, Agency and Employment § 97 (8th 
ed. 1980). 
58. CAL. Bus. & PRoP. CODE § 10176(d) (West Supp. 1982). See Wilson v. Lewis, 106 
Cal. App. 3d 805, 806, 165 Cal. Rptr. 396, 398 (1980); Bonaccono v. Kaplan, 218 Cal. 
App. 2d 63, 68, 32 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72 (1962). 
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vides for sanctions against real estate licensees who violate the 
code. &9 A realtor who engages in dual agency without so inform-
ing the client may be subject to disciplinary action through the 
state Department of Real Estate even though the client suffers 
no pecuniary loss.60 However, Miller and Starr, in the 1981 sup-
plement to their treatise on California real estate law, state that 
"this knowledge and consent is rarely given in the ordinary 
transaction. "61 
Undisclosed dual agency has been held "a species of 
fraud."82 To encourage disclosure, the courts have held that no 
sales commission may be recovered by the dual agent who fails 
to disclose the conflicting arrangements. ea Furthermore, where 
there is undisclosed or unconsented dual agency, either principal 
may rescind the contract of sale without showing actual injury.64 
Absent consent, a broker must expressly disavow an agency 
relation to one of the princip~s to avert the dual agency prob-
lem entirely,66 but disavowal of agency is seldom done in prac-
tice. Therefore, a large proportion of real estate agreements in 
California appear to be rescindable on the grounds of undis-
closed dual agency." These rescindable transactions may be qui-
etly waiting for some enterprising lawyer to discover. The nu-
merous reported California cases in which rescission for 
undisclosed dual agency was granted may be just the tip of the 
iceberg." A growing litigiousness, the changing housing mar-
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 10176(d) (West Supp. 1982). 
60. Buckley v. Savage, 184 Cal. App. 2d 18, 32, 7 Cal. Rptr. 328, 334-35 (1960), cert. 
denied, 366 U.S. 910 (1960). 
61. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, § 4:1B, at 19. 
62. Peyton v. Cly, 184 Cal. App. 2d 193, 19B, 7 Cal. Rptr. 504, 507 (1960). 
63. McConnell v. Cowan, 44 Cal. 2d 805, 810, 285 P.2d 261, 265 (1955); Glenn v. 
Rice, 174 Cal. 269,272,162 P. 1020, 1021 (1917); Jarvis v. Obrien, 147 Cal. App. 2d 758, 
305 P.2d 961 (1957); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY §§ 391. 392. 394 (1958). 
64. Gordon v. Beck, 196 Cal. 768, 771-72, 239 P. 309, 311 (1925). 
65. Some listing brokers claim to avoid the dual agency problem by employing a 
legal fiction in which they refer to the buyer who is interested in a property listed with 
the broker, as a "customer" rather than a client. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra 
note 20, at 5. There is no case law to the point, but it seems clear the client-customer 
scheme is a distinction without a legal difference. 
66. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, at § 4:1B, at 20. 
67. Id. (citing e.g., Vice v. Thacker, 20 Cal. 2d 84, 180 P.2d 4 (1947); Gordon v. 
Beck, 196 Cal. 768, 239 P. 309 (1925); Standard Realty Dev. Co. v. Ferrera, 151 Cal. App. 
2d 514, 311 P.2d 855 (1957); Baird v. Madsen, 57 Cal. App. 2d 465, 124 P.2d 885 (1943)). 
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ket,68 the high cost of correcting latent defects such as sagging 
foundations, etc., and the ongoing consumer movement are cata-
lysts that could produce an an explosion in such litigation. 
What Must Be Disclosed? 
There are two disclosure considerations: The disclosure of 
the dual agency itself and disclosure by the dual agent of perti-
nent facts about the nature of the transaction. 
Disclosure of dual agency itself was discussed in the prior 
section. As to the second element, disclosures of pertinent infor-
mation, general agency law provides that an agent acting for two 
diverse principals "has a duty to act with fairness to each and to 
disclose to each all facts which he knows or should know would 
reasonably affect the judgment of each in permitting such dual 
agency .... "68 The common law rule is that the dual agent has 
If dual agency is not disclosed, 
as is the usual case, and neither party is aware of the dual 
representation, either party may rescind the transaction with-
out proof of actual fraud or injury. 
Since the dual representation is not disclosed in the usual real 
estate transaction, each of the parties and their agents are as-
suming unknown liabilities in many cases and, as bizarre as it 
may sound, most such transactions are rescindable as a motter 
of law! 
1 H. Mn.LER & M. STARR, supra note 1, at § 4:18, at 19 (emphasis in original). 
68. In these times of tight money supply, buyers often take out three to five-year 
first mortgages with large "balloon payments" due at term, speculating on the continued 
appreciation of the real estate, and the hope that interest rates will decline and mortgage 
funds become more readily available. Commentators suggest that many buyers may soon 
go into default if their gamble does not succeed. See The Housing Recession, NEWSWEEK, 
Sept. 21, 1981, at 85. This alone could create a reservoir of disillusioned purchaser-plain-
tiffs seeking rescission from obligations they can not fulfill. 
69. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) 0' AGBNCY § 392 (1958). See Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 
Cal. App. 2d 463, 474, 33 Cal. Rptr. 661, 667 (1963); Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 
2d 50, 68, 172 P.2d 533, 543 (1946). According to the Restatement: 
The agent's disclosure must include not only the fact that he 
is acting on behalf of the other party, but also all facts which 
are .relevant in enabling the principal to make an intelligent 
determination .... The agent, however, is under no duty to 
disclose, and has a duty not to disclose to one principal, confi-
dential information given to him by the other, such as the 
price he is willing to pay. If the information is of such a nature 
that he cannot fairly give advice to one without disclosing it, 
he cannot properly continue to act as advisor . . . . 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 0' AGENCY § 392, Comment b (1958). 
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a duty to disclose to the principal any material fact that would 
affect the principal's decision on the subject matter of the 
agency.70 In California, a broker in a dual agency role also has a 
fiduciary duty to tell the buyer of any latent or patent defects, 
such as the condition of the foundation, the extent of termite or 
r80f damage, etc.71 A recent California Court of Appeal case, 
Jorgensen u. Beach IN' Bay Realty, Inc.,72 held that listing bro-
kers acting in a dual capacity have a fiduciary duty to disclose to 
the vendor that the prospective buyers are investors and that 
the brokers had a substantial personal stake in striking a good 
bargain for them.78 
These conflicting duties of disclosure put the broker in a po-
sition to do disservice to both parties. For example, the listing 
broker who also represents the buyer should inform the unwary 
buyer of recent mud slides in the neighborhood, a fact which 
could be enough to scare off the prudent purchaser. The broker 
would also be obligated to inform the seller of more advanta-
geous offers of third parties and to notify the seller that a pro-
spective buyer, while solvent, has just lost her job and thus may 
default on a seller-carried second mortgage. Being privy to confi-
dential information from both principals which could affect the 
other's position, the dual agent is commonly in the schizo-
phrenic position of having to divulge such information at the ex-
70. Jorgensen v. Beach 'N' Bay Realty, Inc., 125 Cal. App. 3d 155, 177 Cal. Rptr. 882 
(1981) (fiduciary breach in non-disclosure by broker of buyers' status as investors and 
non-disclosure of brokers' stake in striking a good bargain for buyers); Bate v. Marstel-
ler, 175 Cal. App. 2d 573, 580-81, 346 P.2d 903, 907-08 (1959) (Seller's broker loses right 
to agreed upon commission for disclosing to buyers that seller will accept lower price); 
Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 312, 298 P.2d 667, 671 (1956) ("[F)ailure to 
disclose [a more favorable offer than the one presented (or acceptance) ... is equivalent 
to the affirmative representation that no other offer existed."). 
71. Ford v. Cournale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, ISO, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334, 339 (1973) (duty 
to disclose rental income); Saporta v. Barbagelata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 463, 474, 33 Cal. 
Rptr. 661, 667 (1963) (failure to disclose termite damage); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. 
App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 204, 210 (1963) (duty to disclose state of disrepair to 
buyers). 
72. 125 Cal. App. 3d 155, 177 Cal. Rptr. 882 (1981). In Jorgensen, the plaintiff ven-
dors sued their listing broker for fraud, misrepresentation, negligence and breach of 
fiduciary duty when, after selling their property for $200,000, they learned the property 
was immediately resold for $227,000. The trial court nonsuited the plaintiff and the 
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed. 
73. Id. at 162, 177 Cal. Rptr. 882, 886. The Jorgensen court held that if a fact is 
likely to affect the judgment of the principal in assenting to a transaction, the fact is 
"material" and must be disclosed. Id. (citing Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. 2d 214, 224, 169 
P.2d 371, 377 (1944)). 
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pense of one or the other principal.'· 
C. THE BUYER'S WEAK POSITION 
The lack of effective representation is one of the main de-
fects of the dual agency system.7Ii The buyer suffers because of 
the broker's incentive to close the deal quickly, irrespective of 
the merits (from the buyer's viewpoint) of the terms of the sale 
agreement, and because "negative factors" that would make a 
buyer resistant to consummating a deal are often not fully dis-
cussed." Buyers, especially home buyers, are often emotionally 
anxious to close the sale on their dream home, and will some-
times agree to unfair, last-minute changes in purchase terms.77 
The buyer's weak position stems particularly from three 
factors: (1) the choice of broker is often dictated by happen-
stance rather than rational choice;'8 (2) the listing broker's pri-
74. See CAL. R.Jw. ESTATE COMMISSIONER'S REGULATION 2785 (a)(3) which makes 
unlawful: 
[T]he failure by a licensee acting in the capacity of an agent in 
a transaction for the sale, lease, or exchange of real property 
to disclose to a prospective purchaser or leasee facts known to 
the licensee materially a1fecting the value or desirability of the 
property when the licensee has a reason to believe that such 
facts are not known to nor readily observable by a prospective 
purchaser. 
See also note 69 supra; Stambler and Stein, supra note 6. Contra 1 H. MILLER & M. 
STARR, supra note I, at § 4:18 at 19. 
75. CTAA DUAL AGBNCY report, supra note 17, at 50-51. The data for this study is 
based in part on the responses of 32 brokers, attorneys and academics to extensive and 
detailed questionnaires. Of those responding to the questionnaire, a majority agreed that 
the denial of representation to the buyer-transferee in dual agency situations is either an 
"important" or "very important" problem posed by that practice. 
76. ld. at 51 (quoting remarks of a panelist). 
77. ld. at 53. 
ld. at 6-7. 
It would appear that the situation is confusing to all parties 
concerned and may operate to the detriment of buyers. This 
interpretation appears valid despite the fact that the cooperat-
ing agent must, as a licensee, act honestly, truthfully, and 
fairly in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. The confusion 
in the law may make it difficult for listing as well as cooperat-
ing agents to discharge their duties properly in real estate 
transactions. Further, legal uncertainties might entice some 
agents to seek an advantage from the confusion by 'manipulat-
ing' the disclosure of information between seller and buyer. 
78. See R. Hempel, The Role of the Real Estate Broker in the Home Buyi~ Pro-
cess, in STORRS, CONNECTICUT: CENTER FOR REAL EsTATE AND URBAN EcONOMIC STUDIBS, 
UNlVBRSITY OF CONNECTICUT, R.Jw. ESTATE REPORTS No.7, at 43 (1969), quoted in CTAA 
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mary loyalty is to the seller because of his contractual fiduciary 
relationship,'9 and the cooperating broker, unless he is working 
on a fee-for-service basis for the buyer-a. rare situation-is a 
sub-agent of the listing broker;80 and (3) the contingent fee sys-
tem. Because of contingent fees, a real estate broker has little 
incentive to negotiate the lowest possible price. In fact, the bro-
ker's interest is best served with an offer that matches the ask-
ing price, as such an offer is most likely to be successful and 
reduce the need for further negotiations. Thus, any broker's first 
and understandable instinct would be to persuade the buyer 
that an overpriced home is actually a bargain, rather than to 
seek a price reduction from the seller. An additional incentive is 
that the broker's fee is normally paid from the profits on the 
sale of the home. Buyers are lulled into a false sense of security 
that their interests are protected, when in fact there is often no 
one with a primary interest or legal obligation to them.81 It is 
only in retrospect that courts find such obligations in their 
breach. 
D. SINGLE AGENCY AND BUYERS' BROKERS 
The real estate industry has responded in a modest way to 
the problems posed by dual agency in California. A few "alterna-
tive brokers" who represent buyers only, or buyers mostly, have 
been established.8I There are also firms that offer a specified or 
a limited set of services to sellersll on a flat fee or hourly fee 
DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 73. This report shows that the majority of buyers 
contact three to seven brokers in searching for a house, wherell8 the seller usually is 
committed contractually to one broker. The prospective buyer makes an initial contact 
with a realtor through advertisements of specific house listinga. See text accompanying 
note 42 supra. 
79. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
SO. The Berkeley Multiple Listing Service's Authorization to Sell-Exclusive .Right 
Listing form contains the following language: "It is understood Broker is a broker mem-
ber of Berkeley MLS. Members of said MLS may act in association with Broker in pro-
curing or attempting to procure a purchaser." This creates an implied sub-agency rela-
tionship between the listing broker and the cooperating broker. 
81. Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 290, 81 Cal. Rptr. 23, 27 (1969). See also 
Johnston v. Seargeants, 152 Cal. App. 2d ISO, 313 P.2d 41 (1957); Kruse v. Miller, 143 
Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (1956). In Hale, the court held the buyer's agent to be an 
agent of the seller because he split the commission with the seller's broker. 
Brokers have a statutory duty to refrain from false representations and fraud, even 
where there is no fiduciary relationship. CAL. Bus. & PROP. CODE §§ 10176(a) to 10176(c), 
10176(i) (West Supp. 1982). 
82. CT AA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20. 
83. Some provide counselling as to price and advertising, but require the owner to 
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basis.1W 
The buyers brokers avoid the dual agency problem and its 
inherent conflicts of interest and risk of litigation by establish-
ing a single agency relationship with their clients and explicitly 
renouncing any agency relationship with the opposing party.8lI 
Some buyer's brokers use an exclusive right to buy agreement 
which guarantees a fee for their service when their client closes 
escrow on a suitable purchase.88 These brokers receive no com-
mission from the seller or listing broker and function as inde-
pendent contractors representing the buyer in securing the best 
deal.87 However, there are few such agencies in California. 
At least one Multiple Listing Service88 has re-written its 
listing agreement to explicitly negate any express or implied 
agency between the listing broker and the buyer.89 The vast ma-
jority of brokers in California, however, continue to split fees 
under a sub-agency agreement. There remains considerable re-
sistance among multiple listing services to adopting single 
agency arrangements; and brokers who unilaterally adopt such 
agreements are sometimes shunned by both the MLS and other 
brokers as mavericks,90 despite possible anti-trust violations.91 
show the property. 
84. There are actually a variety of fee arrangements in single agency firms. Many 
still accept a fee split with the listing broker. Some employ a percentage of sale agree-
ment, with the percent ranging from 2 to 15 percent. Flat fees usually depend on the 
dollar value of the transaction, its complexity and the amount of service to be rendered. 
Hourly fees range from $50 to $225. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20, at 27. 
85. Id. at 25-26. 
86. Id. at 26. 
87. The CTAA study involved interviews with 29 brokers who used at least some 
single agency agreements. These were predominately brokers of commercial, industrial or 
income residential property. Only about a third of their business involved a typical home 
sale. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20, at 12. Most of these brokers did not 
limit their business to single agency. By "single agency," the brokers were 88id to mean 
that they either refused to represent the buyer in the negotiations for one of the proper-
ties they listed or that they would take on the purchaser as a "customer" rather than a 
client. The customer enjoys no agency relationship, and is expressly notified of that fact. 
Id. at 25. 
88. The Menlo Park-Atherton Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service has such a 
single-agencY agreement which eliminates the sub-agency relation of the cooperating 
broker to the listing broker. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20, at 21. 
89. Id. at 27-28. 
90. Id. at 24. 
91. See note 116 infra. 
17
Kroll: Dual Agency in Real Estate
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
396 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:379 
III. THE DUAL AGENCY DILEMMA: POSSIBLE 
RESOLUTIONS 
Dual representation is a most unfortunate misnomer for the 
problem presented in residential real estate brokerage. Actually 
there are three competing interests in the normal real estate 
sales transaction: the interest of the vendor in the highest price 
and best terms; that of the purchaser in the lowest price and 
best terms; and that of the dual agent who desires any accept-
able agreement which would bring the principals together and 
close the deal. Unfortunately, in this pivotal position, the real 
estate agent has few ethical signposts to follow. Regulations of 
the California Department of Real Estateel contain prohibitions 
on obvious fiduciary breaches, such as fraud and misrepresenta-
tions," non-disclosure of material facts," inducing the principal 
to act against her own interestell and self-dealing," but they do 
not discuss the dual representation situation. 
There are in fact no real estate departmental regulations 
that provide the general ethical guidance for licensees in repre-
senting adverse interests that, for example, the American Bar 
Association's Model Code of Professional Responsibility" pro-
vides lawyers. ABA Canon 5,88 including its disciplinary rules 
and ethical considerations," provides special guidance to law-
yers by prohibiting representation of clients with differing inter-
ests100 "unless it is obvious tht he can adequately represent the 
92. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 2785(a) (1981) deals with unlawful conduct and 
§ 2785(b) deals with unethical conduct. Section 2785(a) contains mandatory sections 
dealing with fraud, dishonest dealing, and conduct warranting denial or revocation of a 
real estate license under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10176, 10177 (West Supp. 1982). 
93. CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, § 2785(a)(l) (1981). 
94. 1d. § 2785(a)(3). 
95. 1d. § 2785(a)(6). 
96. 1d. § 2785(a)(11). 
97. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (amended ed. 1980). 
98. Canon 5 provides: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment 
on behalf of a client." 1d. 
1d. 
99. See id. DR 5-105(AHC) and EC 5-15 to 5-20. 
100. DR 5-105(A) requires a lawyer to 
"decline proffered employment if the exercise of his indepen-
dent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is 
likely to be adversely affected by the acceptance of the prof-
fered employment, or if it would be likely to involve him in 
representing differing interests, except to the extent permitted 
under DR 5-105(C)." 
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interests of each and if each consents. . . after full disclosure of 
the possible effect of such representation .... "101 Under Canon 
5, all doubts about such divided loyalties should be resolved 
against the propriety of the representation. lOll The industry and 
the regulators would do well to investigate the desirability of im-
posing ethical guidelines for the representation of mUltiple di-
verse interests. 
Department of Real Estate Study 
The California Department of Real Estate commissioned a 
study of the problem of dual agency in California real estate 
transactions. The resulting report, issued by California Techni-
cal Assistance Associates, Inc. (CTAA) in February, 1981, sheds 
considerable light both on the impact of dual agency in real es-
tate practice and on the perceptions of real estate industry peo-
ple, real estate lawyers and academicians as to the scope of the 
problem. loa 
The report concludes that "[w]ithin the complex web of po-
tential obligations and liabilities between [sic] buyers, sellers, 
agents, and subagents, the courts have not been reluctant to find 
an agency relationship when necessary to protect the interests of 
either party damaged by a real estate broker's actions. "104 
101. ld. DR 5-105(C) (emphasis added). 
102. ld. EC 5-15. 
103. CTAA DUAL AOENCY report, supra note 17. 
104. ld. at 30. See also id. at 26 (citing Miller v. Wood, 222 Cal. App. 2d 206, 35 Cal. 
Rptr. 49 (1963) ("[T]here is a compelling reason to find a real estate agent to be an agent 
whenever his acts or omiBBions cause injury in a real estate tranaaction. "). In Kruse v. 
Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656,300 P.2d 855 (1956), the court found the innocent seller of a 
property liable for the misrepresentations of a cooperating broker to the buyer, but per-
mitted the seller to recover the 108S from the broker. ld. at 660, 300 P.2d at 858. In 
Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 390, 333 P.2d 423 (1958), where the buyer sued 
the seller for misrepresentations made by the cooperating broker, the. court permitted 
the seller to recover from the listing broker. 
The CT AA researchers said the predeliction of the courts to find agency relations 
and fiduciary obligations, even in situations where the parties had not originally ex-
pected or desired to have such relationships, creates unacceptable conflicts for brokers in 
the most common of real estate transactions. 
[T]he broker cannot pursue the interests of both the buyer 
and seller equally, i.e., he cannot recommend acceptance by 
the seller of an offer he/she knows is close without violating 
his/her duty to obtain the best terms for the seller, and alter-
natively, he/she would violate hia/her duty to obtain the best 
terms Cor the buyer if he/she did not recommend acceptance. 
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The CT AA researchers recommend that the Department of 
Real Estate take several specific actions to cope with the inher-
ent conflicts of interest arising from dual agency,lOI but there is 
scant discussion of the ethical implications of dual representa-
tion,l06 and no suggestion that existing regulations could amelio-
rate the problems. Notably absent from the CTAA recommenda-
tions is the call for outright elimination or limitation of dual 
agency in residential real estate transactions. Rather, elimina-
tion of dual representation was listed merely as one of four pol-
icy options for the licensing agency to consider.'o7 
CT AA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 32. 
However, case law to date has yet to find a cooperating broker liable for authorized 
acts for one princi{lal which were in no way culpable except that they violated a fiduciary 
obligation to the other principal. Id. at 33. The authors state that the decided cases have 
all dealt with material misrepresentations that were neither known by nor acceded to by 
the principal. 
105. They are: 
[1) The DRE should increase the emphasis on dual agency in li-
censing examinations; dispense more information on dual 
agency to agents; and encourage consideration of dual agency 
in continuing education; 
[2j The department should encourage consumers to explore single 
agency arrangements when entering the real estate market; 
develop appropriate standard forms for astablilhing single 
agency; and develop guidelines for establishing lingle agency; 
and, 
(3) The DRE should develop standard disclosure ltatements for 
all types of transactions in which dual agency could arise. The 
disclosure should specify the duties and obligations of the li-
censee, issues not subject to agency (e.g. price), and make ref-
erence to potential conflicts of interest. It should also institute 
disclosure requirements for dual agency arrangements in real 
estate transactions which would be printed on listing agree-
ments and deposit receipts. These disclosure statements 
should be drafted by the DRE in collaboration with industry 
representatives. 
CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 70. 
106. Id. at 49. 
107. They are: 
[1) Elimination of dual agency by requiring single agency between 
agents and clients; 
(2) Establishing single agency under certain conditions (this re-
tains the status quo except to encourage single agency via a 
policy statement by the Real Estate Commission and a public 
information campaign); 
(3) Continuation of dual agency but clarification through the use 
of disclosure statements of the duties and obliaations of bro-
kers to principals; and 
(4) Improved education for real estate licensees to increase aware-
ness of legal obligations and liabilities of dual agency 
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Eliminating Dual Agency By Statute 
There are few who absolutely would proscribe dual agency 
in real estate transactions. Miller and Starr may be alone in 
their zeal for institution of single agency. The industry as a 
whole has not taken a position on the subject,108 though there 
are, arguably, financial incentives for ending dual agency: the 
elimination of some of the potential liability for breaches of 
fiduciary duty, and a greater spreading of sales fees among the 
smaller brokers. Large brokerages, naturally, handle a propor-
tionately larger percentage of the in-house (one broker) sales be-
cause they have the largest number of listings in any given com-
munity, and thus may lose some of the advantage of their very 
size. 
A change to single agency, or the elimination of sub-agency, 
however, would require a significant alteration in the means of 
doing business for the vast majority of real estate brokers. Bro-
kers would have to refer potential purchasers to competitor 
firms. Of course, such referrals would be reciprocal if dual 
agency were barred, thus balancing the benefit and burden of 
the practice. Multiple listing agreements would have to be re-
written to eliminate sub-agency by cooperating brokers. There is 
a natural resistance to change in any large industry. 
Single agency, which is the norm only in commercial trans-
actions where clients have developed a business relationship 
with a particular real estate firm,109 could become the rule in 
residential sales as well. But this is unlikely to occur through 
widespread voluntary action of the market. The elimination of 
sub-agency in the Menlo Park-Atherton listing agreement oc-
curred largely because of the unusual combination of factors pe-
culiar to that extraordinarily affluent, legally sophisticated 
community. no 
arrangements. 
Id. at 70·79. Given the seeming ignorance of the licensees of these matters, option four 
should be implemented regardless of which other courses are followed. If dual agency 
were eliminated, new educational requirements would have to be developed to incorpo. 
rate the new rules, but there would be no need for further dual agency disclosure 
requirements. 
108. Officials for the California Association of Realtors said the association has no 
position on the subject at this time. 
109. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20, at 19·22. 
110. The acceptance of single agency in Menlo Park was due to the concentration in 
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Consumers and consumer groups have long favored changes 
in the agency relationships and have applauded even modest ef-
forts to improve the representation of buyers of real estate.lll 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has responded to com-
ments and complaints from these groups with an investigation. 
The FTC has published a set of recommendations 111 for changes 
in sales practices to encourage competitiveness in real estate 
brokerage, to improve consumer awareness of choices currently 
available in broker-buyer relations, and to clarify the legal du-
ties between brokers and among brokers and consumers,118 but 
these have yet to be adopted. 
Eliminating dual agency in real estate transactions would 
require repeal of California Business and Professions Code sec-
tion 19176(d)114 and changes in the implementing provision of 
real estate department regulations. A new statute mandating 
single agency would be required and appropriate administrative 
regulations would have to be adopted.11I Further, the sub-agency 
provisions of multiple listing agreements would have to be 
eliminated. lUI 
that community of very sophisticated brokers, many with Ph.D's and Master's Degrees, 
who are concerned about making mistakes in representation and who are keenly aware of 
the responsibilities and implications of real estate law. ld. at 22. The realty board coun-
sel's strong advocacy and the currently high selling price of homes in the area (average 
selling price of MLS-Iisted homes in 1981 was $287,000) were also major factors support-
ing single agency relationships. [d. 
ll1. See Does the 'Buyer's Agent' Represent the Buyer?, CONSUMER REPORTS, Sept., 
1980, at 573. The Federal Trade Commission reports receiving complaint letters, peti-
tions, and public statements from individuals and consumer groups calling attention to 
the problem of inadequate representation of buyer's and seller's interests. 45 Fed. Reg. 
77 ,959 (1980). 
ll2. 46 Fed. Reg. 25,476 (1981). The FrC has yet to take action on the proposal. 
The staff report raises the issue of competitiveness of commissions "in light of the com-
monplace 6 or 7 percent commission rates" and of possible conflicts of interest and con-
sumer under-representation. [d. 
U3._ld. 
ll4. (West Supp. 1982). That section states: "The commissioner may ... tempora-
rily suspend or permanently revoke a real estate license . . . where the licensee·. . . has 
been guilty of ... [a]cting for more than one party in a transaction without the knowl-
edge or consent of all parties thereto." 
ll5. For example, the statute could read: "A licensee shall represent as agent only 
one side to a transaction. A broker representing a vendor shall refer all prospective pur-
chasers to another licensee. Licensees representing buyers shall have a primary obliga-
tion and duty to the buyer's interests, regardless of who is paying the fee." 
ll6. The advantages of this proposal were identified by the CTAA Dual Agency re-
port. It: 
[I] eliminates conflicts of interest inherent in dual agency; 
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The state could take a softer approach to the problem and 
(2) facilitates "arm's length" dealing between buyers and sellers; 
(3] reduces the risk of (fraud and malpractice) litigation for brokers; 
[4] improves representation for the buyer and possibly for the seller; 
(5) improves the position of the cooperating broker who was often in a conflict of 
interest situation; 
(6) shifts the viewpoint of real estate agents from that of deal-makers to profession-
als whose behavior now closely resembles that of other professionals such as attorneys. 
CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 70-71. 
On the negative side, eliminating dual agency might prevent the buyer from using 
the remedy of rescission and restitution in the event of a misrepresentation by the coop-
erating broker. Id. at 72. The explanation is that the seller is liable to the buyer for 
misrepresentations of the listing broker because of the sub-agency relation between co-
operating and listing brokers. Id. (citing Romero, supra note 19, at 773 n.33). Romero 
notes that the seller is liable to the buyer in tort for misrepresentations of the cooperat-
ing broker through the ratification doctrine. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 82, 
90-100, 218 (1958). Abolishing the sub-agency relation would preclude that liability and 
eliminate rescission as a buyer's remedy for a breach by seller's broker, and thus would 
be more harmful than helpful. That is true, but it does not eliminate remedies against 
the broker for damages. And, if the misrepresentation was ratified by the listing broker, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 82, 92-93, 90-100, 218 (1958), that misrepresenta-
tion may be imputed to the seller, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2338, 2339 (West 1954), giving the 
buyer a cause of action against the seller. See also CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra 
note 17, at 65, 67. 
Currently, the cooperating broker has a fiduciary relation to the seller, which ren-
ders the seller liable for the acts of that broker. Granberg v. Turnham, 166 Cal. App. 2d 
390, 333 P.2d 423, (1958); Johnston v. Seargeants, 152 Cal. App. 2d 180, 313 P.2d 41 
(1957). See also Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 432, 546 P.2d 307, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19 (1976); 
Wright v. Lowe, 140 Cal. App. 2d 891, 296 P.2d 34 (1956). Of course, without the 
problems inherent in dual agency, there may be no need for rescission. 
The CTAA Dual Agency report makes two other arguments against elimination of 
dual agency which seem to be red herrings. One is that elimination of dual agency would 
threaten the rights of cooperating brokers to commissions in the event of a seller's de-
fault without cause. Of course, eliminating dual agency does not prevent any broker from 
contractually obligating the seller to pay the commission in such a situation. The report 
claims the threat to commissions for cooperating brokers would reduce the number of 
cooperative sales and increase the potential for "in house" sales, hence, dual agency situ-
ations. If dual agency were eliminated, in-house sales would probably be virtually impos-
sible to consummate within the law. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 72. 
The second point is even more spurious: that elimination of sub-agency relations 
between listing brokers and cooperating brokers would somehow destroy the MLS pro-
gram as buyers would gain direct access to it. Id. at 72. Since buyers are the major com-
petitor to the broker (because they may learn of a listing independent of MLS), MLS 
listings are confidential and open to member brokers only. This protects brokers member 
from direct competition by the buying public. (Although many broker-members of MLS 
routinely violate the confidentiality of the listings, such breaches of confidentiality are 
technically grounds for discipline by the local MLS.) CTAA argues that if buyers had 
unrestricted access to MLS listings. the number of cooperating brokers would diminish. 
in effect. due to competitive disadvantages. That in turn would lead to the eventual 
withering away of the MLS, to the detriment of the public. which is served by it as a 
marketing mechanism. 
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merely encourage the use of single agency arrangements on a 
voluntary basis and adopt some ethical guidelines analogous to 
the ethical considerations in ABA Canon 5.117 This would shield 
sellers from liability for actions of a cooperating broker, would 
provide buyers better representation, and give an impetus for 
the establishment of single agency or buyer's brokerage firms. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that dual agency rela-
tionships could continue, leaving brokers and sellers liable for 
the actions of cooperating brokers, and retaining a system in 
which in the ordinary real estate transaction brokers will con-
tinue to have deeply-conflicted loyalties. However, an ethical 
stricture could bring enormous pressure to bear on licensees to 
avoid dual agency, because violation of such guidelines could 
provide a basis for disciplinary action or presumptive evidence 
of legal liability.lI8 
Alternatively, the Department of Real Estate could place 
the onus to opt for single agency on the client by requiring that 
a caveat be added to every real estate purchase offer form, read-
ing: "It is strongly recommended that the buyer seek representa-
tion from an agent or lawyer who has no agency relationship 
with the seller."lI8 
This argument ignores the ruling in People v. National Ass'n of Realtors, 120 Cal. 
App. 3d 459, 174 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1981), which held the policy, adopted by local, state and 
national real estate associations, of excluding non-members from the residential multiple 
listing service constituted an illegal group boycott and unlawful restraint of trade under 
sections 16700 to 16750 of the California Business and Professions Code. 120 Cal. App_ 
3d at 478, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Even if the confidentiality of MLS listings were not an 
anti-trust violation, it makes little sense to try to maintain the confidentiality of the 
listings when the confidentiality rule is so openly flouted. Further, there is no reason for 
buyers who use the MLS to obtain listing information not to seek the professional repre-
sentation services and expertise of a broker in considering the relative merits of various 
properties, preparing an offer, and seeking financing. These services could be offered on 
flat fee or hourly basis, like those of any other professional. 
117. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmlLiTY (amended ed. 1980), Canon 5, at 
24. 
118. Brokers who want to organize as buyers' brokers would benefit by this type of 
encouragement, because as these agencies gain acceptance in the industry and receive 
official sanction, they will gain credibility with the public. 
119. A state-mandated caveat of this type would not be unprecedented. CAL. Bus. & 
PROF. CODE § 10147.5 (West Supp. 1982) requires a statement be appended to any agree-
ment for the payment of a real estate commission: "Notice: The amount or rate of real 
estate commissions is not fixed by law. They are set by each broker individually and may 
be negotiable between the seller and broker." ld. 
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A clearly-written statement to be signed by both principals, 
could be added to the offeror's deposit receipt, disclosing and 
explaining the significance to both principals of the dual agency 
and spelling out the duties of the agents. This should alert the 
parties to the advantages of separate representation, and elimi-
nate . some misunderstandings of the parties. The disclosure 
statement could be used either for in-house sales, or in coopera-
tive sales.IIO Buyers and sellers have a reasonable right to expect 
some degree of neutrality and professionalism from their agents. 
Improved disclosure would not provide that neutrality, but it 
would enhance the professionalism of the industry. 
In any case, once the dual agency itself has been properly 
disclosed, the courts sometimes relieve dual agents of the con-
flicting· duty to disclose to both principals material information 
about the subject property and the transaction.lU This creates 
the anomalous situation in which a broker can be held to be an 
agent while being excused of some of the major fiduciary obliga-
tions of an agent, i.e., the duties of absolute loyalty and disclo-
sure.12ll Thus, merely improving the dual agency disclosure re-
quirements leaves one of the objectionable aspects of dual 
agency unresolved, and does not eliminate the underlying prob-
lem of under-representation of the buyer. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Far stricter control is warranted over the dual agency rela-
tionship in the real estate business, given the great potential for 
harm to the parties to the ordinary real property transaction.128 
There is a basic duality of interest in the contingent fee system 
of the real estate business: The sale agent's primary financial in-
terest is to close the sale with the least investment of time, and 
120. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 76. 
121. 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note I, at § 4:18. Skopp v. Weaver, 16 Cal. 3d 
432, 439, n.7, 546 P.2d 307, 311, 128 Cal. Rptr. 19, 23 (1976) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 392, Comment b (1958): "[In a dual agency the) agent ... is under no 
duty to disclose, and has a duty not to disclose to one principal, confidential information 
given to him by the other."). But see Vincent v. Thompson, 218 Or. 100, 343 P.2d 904 
(1959); Richer v. Burke, 147 Or. 465, 34 P.2d 317 (1934). 
122. Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 674-75, 441 P.2d 101, 109-10,68 Cal. Rptr. 
589, 597·98 (1968). 
123. See Sampson and Kirby, supra note 14, at 10. 
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that conflicts squarely with the duty to serve the principals in 
negotiating the best terms for each of the parties at an accept-
able price. When dual agency is added to that dual interest, 
there is great potential for unfair and fraudulent dealing. 
Dual agency is preferred by real estate agents because it al-
lows them the flexibility of negotiating purchases and sales from 
among the clients of their firm, and enables a single agent to 
capture the entire sales commission. The alternative, single 
agency, would impose a level of professionalism on the real es-
tate business that the industry has thus far managed to avoid. 
The risks of dual agency are borne by the individual least 
able to appreciate their significance: the consumer seeking to 
purchase a house. Those who know better, commercial and in-
dustrial real estate clients, usually are represented separately.114 
Home buyers, who are less legally sophisticated, happily accept 
the free services of the listing broker and are thus effectively 
unrepresented in the ordinary home sale transaction. III 
The law makes a feeble attempt to protect the client from 
outright duplicity by requiring disclosure. lie Disclosure of dual 
agency, however, is perfunctory at best, frequently haphazard, 
and often overlooked as a legal and ethical imperative largely 
because of the contingent fee system in real estate brokerage.1I7 
Even when there is disclosure and consent to dual agency, the 
inherent conflict of interest is not resolved, only acknowledged. 
Under those circumstances, unfair dealing by agents is either 
rife but unreported, or is uncommon only because of the innate 
honesty of real estate agents.118 Costly and wasteful rescission 
battles may be the only way for the hapless purchaser to undo 
the harm done by the lack of representation. 
Undisclosed dual agency could become a standard legal 
ground for rescission if the industry or the state does not enact 
124. CTAA SINGLE AGENCY report, supra note 20, at 10-14. 
125. Id. 
126. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176(d) (West Supp. 1982). 
127. CTAA DUAL AGENCY report, supra note 17, at 2. Informal inquiries revealed 
that there are few California real estate boards that recommend formal written disclo-
sure of dual agency. Rather, disclosure is left to the individual agent and is usually done 
orally. 
128. See note 2 supra. 
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more rigorous requirements. As a minimal first step on the road 
to curing the ambiguities and conflicts of interest inherent in 
dual agency, an explicit disclosure statement, spelling out duties, 
liabilities and even motives of the broker should be required by 
statute. 
The problems of inherent conflict of interest and the under-
representation of buyers in the realty market are exacerbated by 
the permissive statutory provisions and common law that allow 
a single entity to serve conflicting masters .. In the interests of 
justice, the California courts have been willing to expand to a 
considerable degree the liability of brokers in real estate transac-
tions where divided loyalties have compromised the interests of 
an innocent party.llil The courts have found sub-agency relations 
and the attendant fiduciary obligations even in situations where 
neither the industry nor the public had expressly intended 
them. ISO This is a two-edged sword: It provides a right of action 
for wronged· parties. But it is remedial in nature and thus waste-
ful when the problem could largely be averted if each party to a 
real estate transaction were represented independently. 
The legislature must give serious consideration to requiring 
single agency relations in home sales. The state should either 
encourage establishment of single agency brokerage houses, or it 
should eliminate dual agency altogether. Otherwise, the state, in 
a matter of years, may see an avalanche of litigation by home 
buyers and sellers against real estate agents for breaches of duty 
and negligence. 
Robert E. Kroll 
129. See note 32 supra. 
130. See Hale v. Wolfsen, 276 Cal. App. 2d 285, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1969) (cooperating 
broker in commercial property exchange held the subagent of the listing broker, with 
fiduciary obligations to both buyers and sellers). 
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